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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
JOHNNIE MICHAEL CHAVEZ, Case No. 16132 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by Information with the crimes of 
Manslaughter and Automobile Homicide arising out of an automobile 
accident on July 21, 19 77. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr. sitting with a jury, on March 27, 28, and 29, 1978. 
The case was sent to the jury on the charge of Automobile Homicide 
and appellant was found guilty of that offense. Thereafter, appellant 
was committed to the Utah State Prison for the term provided by 
law, zero to five years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the conviction against 
him. In h t e alternative, appellant seeks a new trial and that 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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appellant be properly sentenced. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 21, 1977, at 10:45 p.m. at 3900 South State 
Street in Salt Lake County, appellant was involved in an automobile 
accident with another automobile driven by Gunnar Skollingsberg 
(R. 219, 220, 361, 362). In the Skollingsberg vehicle was 26 month 
old Eric who died as a result of head injuries suffered in the 
accident. 
Mr. Skollingsberg testified he was southbound on State 
Street, stopped for a red light in the left turn lane, then turned 
left, or east, onto 3900 South when his car was hit by an automobile 
coming north on State Street (R. 220-229). Mr. Skollingsberg said 
his left turn light was green when he last saw it (R. 229). 
Other persons at the intersection said appellant's 
automobile was going north on State Street in the eastern most part 
of the road, at a high rate of speed when the two cars collided 
(R. 247, 265). The automobile driven by appellant was in what is 
used as a right turn lane, a cement gutter portion of the road, 
not designated as part of the road but used frequently by automobile 
traffic and buses (R. 249, 354). There were skid marks shortly 
before the point of impact (R. 326). 
Appellant was arrested near the accident scene, walking 
briskly, and was administered first aid for his injuries, and taken 
to a hospital (R. 304, 309). The arresting officers said they 
- 2 -
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smelled the odor of alcohol on appellant, but made no other obser-
vations of him other than that appellant was "upset" (R. 305, 313). 
At the hospital appellant told the officer that the 
light was green for him (R. 313, 323). Samples of blood were taken 
from appellant at 12:14 a.m. and 12:48 a.m. on July 22, 1977 (R. 372, 
373, Exhibits ll and 12). Lynn Davis, a chemist, performed tests 
on appellant's blood samples and determined the blood alcohol level 
to be 0.19 for each of the two tests (R. 396, Exhibits ll and 12). 
Bryan Finkle, a pharmacologist, said that given the facts he had, 
and assuming the last drink of alcohol was 10: 30 p. m. on July 21, 
1977, the blood alcohol level would have been between 0. 05 and 0. 08 
at 10:45 p.m., the time of the accident (R. 459). 
None of the arresting officers, or others who had con-
tact with appellant at the accident scene or the hospital, were 
asked for, nor did they render, an opinion as to whether appellant 
was under the influence of alcohol. Eppie Duran, who was with 
appellant before and during the accident, said appellant was "not 
, unusual" in his behavior, but he told appellant to slow down (R. 362). 
- 3 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THAT AN 
ELEMENT OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE WAS NEGLIGENCE 
AND THE COURT PROPERLY SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY THAT CRIHINAL NEGLIGENCE IS REQUIRED 
TO SUSTAIN A CHARGE OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE. 
Appellant was charged in one count of the Information 
with Automobile Homicide. Appellant contends that the Court errone· 
ously instructed the jury in the elements of automobile homicide 
because the Court instructed the jury that simple negligence was 
all that the State needed to prove and appellant contends that 
criminal negligence is a necessary element of any homicide offense 
in the State of Utah. 
The Court in Instruction No. 14 (R. 75) defined automob'. 
homicide as defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 (1953 as amended) ar. 
said that it was sufficient if a person caused the death of another 
by operating a vehicle in a negligent manner. The Court in Instruc: 
No. 15 (R. 76) also used in paragraph 4 the term simple negligence 
as the necessary element. Negligence was defined by the Court in 
Instruction Nos. 18 and 19 (R. 79, 80). Appellant excepted to th< 
giving of those instructions (R. 472) on the basis that criminal 
negligence was necessary. Appellant offered instructions which 
. and set defined automobile homicide and required criminal negligence 
out the elements of automobile homicide, one of those elements bein' 
criminal negligence rather than simple negligence (R. 107' lOB). 
- 4 -
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Appellant's contention at the time of trial and now is 
:hat under our statutes no offense is a criminal offense unless a 
person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal 
negligence or his act constitutes an offense involving strict 
liability. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-101 (1953 as amended). Further, 
appellant was charged with a form of criminal homicide and our 
statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-201 (1953 as amended) provides that 
a person corrrrnits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, or with criminal negligence unlawfully causes the death 
of another. Criminal Homicide is defined as murder in the first 
and second degree, manslaughter, or negligent homicide, or automo-
bile homicide. Appellant is fully aware that this argument has 
been made and rejected by this Court in three previous cases, 
State v. Durant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah, 1977), State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 
398 (Utah, 1977) and State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah, 1977). 
Appellant contends that the opinions in those cases are and were 
erroneous and the dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan in State 
v. Durant, supra, is the correct law in the State of Utah, and 
should be adopted by this Court and the above three cited cases 
should be overruled based upon reasoning set forth by Justice Maughan. 
Our statutes are clear in defining offenses and there is a substantial 
difference between simple negligence as defined by this Court in 
those cases and as defined by the trial court in this matter in its 
Instruction Nos. 18 and 19 and in criminal negligence as defined by 
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our code. 
Under the facts of this case where appellant was found 
guilty of automobile homicide, it is apparent that the jury found 
appellant to be negligent in his driving pattern otherwise appellant 
could not have been found guilty. However, had the jury been 
properly instructed that he must have acted with criminal negligence 
using the definition of criminal negligence, the jury may not have 
found that the risk taken by appellant was of such a nature and 
degree that failure to perceive it (namely the red light) constitute:' 
a gross deviation from the standard of care than an ordinary person ' 
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from appellant's 
standpoint. That is, it is easy to say in retrospect that a jury 
would find going through a red light to be criminal negligence bm 
that can only be said because the jury found appellant was negligent· 
in apparently going through a red light. The clear difference 
between negligence and criminal negligence could easily have made 
a vast difference in the outcome of this case as the evidence of 
intoxication was slight or nil as will be discussed in Point II and , 
Point III. 
This Court should overrule the decisions in State !'..:. 
Durant, supra, State v. Anderson, supra, and State v. Wade, supra, 
and follow our statutes as set forth above and adopt the reasoning 
of Justice Maughan in his dissenting opinion in State v. Dura!!£, 
supra. 
- 6 -
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POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
ON THE PRESUMPTIONS CREATED BY A BLOOD ALCOHOL 
LEVEL ABOVE 0.08 BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT SUCH AN INSTRUCTION. 
Appellant contends it was reversible error for the trial 
court to instruct the jury on the presumptions created by a certain 
blood alcohol level because there was absolutely no evidence to 
1 
support such an instruction, and such an instruction only confused 
and deluded the jury in their deliberations and confused the question 
of intoxication. 
To convict one of automobile homicide, the State must 
prove that a person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely driving 
a vehicle. Clearly from that the State must prove that at the time 
of the driving which allegedly resulted in the death that the person 
' was under the influence of alcohol. The Court so instructed the 
jury, but the Court also instructed the jury on the presumptions 
created by certain blood alcohol levels. In Instruction No. 17 
(R. 78) the Court instructed the jury that if there was at the 
time of driving 0.05% or less by weight of alcohol in appellant's 
blood it was presumed he was not under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor· If the blood alcohol level was between 0. 05 and 0. 08 at 
the time of the d · · h · · d h C t riving t ere is no presumption an t e our 
instructed · 17 h i· f in paragraph number 3 of Instruction No. t at 
there wa . 
s at the time of driving 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol 
- 7 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in appellant's blood it shall be presumed that appellant was under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor. Appellant objected to that 
instruction (R. 472) on the basis that there was no evidence to 
support such an instruction (R. 473). 
In an effort to show appellant's alleged intoxication 
the State introduced evidence that appellant's blood was taken at 
12:14 a.m. and 12:48 a.m. on July 22, these times being some hour 
and a half and two hours after the incident is alleged to have 
occurred at 10:45 p.m. on July 21, 1977 (R. 390, 396, 370, 373). 
At those times in the early hours of July 22 there was testimony, 
objected to (see Point III A) that appellant's blood alcohol level 
at those times was 0. 19. In an effort to "relate back" or "extrapo· 
late" those figures back to the relevant time of the accident, 10:4i • 
p. m. on July 21 (R. 32) the State called Bryan Finkle, employed 
by the University of Utah as a toxicologist and pharmacologist. 
He testified at length, taking 32 pages of transcript, about t~ 
effects of alcohol on the body and about how one can perform such 
computations in attempting to figure a blood alcohol level at an 
earlier time given the blood alcohol level at a later time. 
He engaged in certain assumptions given him and testified that it 
was very important that he know when the last drink occurred before 
driving because without that information he could not possibly 
know a person's blood alcohol level at a given time (R. 458) · He 
assumed, apparently based upon the testimony of Eppie Duran that 
- 8 -
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:·Ir. Duran had been with appellant during the evening and appellant 
had nothing to drink after 10: 30 p .m. and before that he had a 
glass with something in it (R. 356, 357, 358), that appellant's 
last drink would have been no later than 10:30 p.m. on July 21, 
1977. Given that assumption and other factors which he assumed 
he related back to the time of driving, 10: 45 p. m. and said that 
appellant's blood alcohol level would have been between 0. 05 and 
0.08 (R. 459). There was no other evidence given as to appellant's 
blood alcohol level. There was no evidence that it was higher than 
0.08 at the time of driving, only that it was 0 .19 some one and half 
and two hours later and Dr. Finkle described the phenomenon of blood 
alcohol level rising to reach a certain peak and then decreasing 
linearly over time. Simply stated there was no evidence that at 
the time of driving the blood alcohol level was above 0. 08. There-
fore, the instruction given by the Court was confusing and erroneous 
and was reversible error. 
In State v. Chealey, 100 Utah 420, 116 P.2d 377 (1941) 
this Court reversed a conviction for involuntary manslaughter based 
upon reasons appellant is advancing in this case. In that case 
the Court instructed the jury that it was unlawful for a person to 
be driving on a public highway at a speed greater than was reasonable 
and prudent and the Court pointed out that there was no evidence in 
the State' · d · · s case at all, that the defendant in that case was riving 
at an excessive speed. The Court pointed out that the instructon 
"as a co 
rrect general statement of the law but served no purpose 
- 9 -
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in the case and should not have been given because there was no 
evidence of the speed that was greater than that which was reasonat> 
and prudent. The Court also instructed the jury that it was U.'llaw-
ful for a person to drive while he was under the influence to such 
an extent that his ability to see objects was diminished 
in any substantial degree. Again the Court pointed out that if the 
State's evidence had shown that the defendant was under the influenc: 
of intoxicating liquor the instruction would have been correct. Tbe 
instruction given by the Court did correctly state the traffic laws 
but this Court pointed out that the jury was committed "to go fishi:.; 
into fields upon which no evidence was presented". This Court 
reversed the conviction. 
In State v. Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 45, 492 P.2d 1347 (1971), 
this Court reversed a conviction for grand larceny because an instru: 
tion was given defining aiding and abetting and there was no evidence: 
supporting such an instruction. That was the only point on appeal 
and that was the sole basis for this Court's reversing the convictic: 
Appellant contends that in this case there the testimonv 
was lengthy dealing with this "relation back" testimony as to what 
a person's blood alcohol level is at any given time, that it was 
particularly troublesome to the jury to decide what to do with 
· ny of Instruction No. 17 of the Court when coupled with the testimo 
the so-called experts. The bottom line of Dr. Finkle' s testimony 
was h bl d 1 h 1 1 1 i-. ti"me of dri·vi·ng was less tha-n that t e oo a co o eve at t.~e 
- 10 -
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o.OS. An instruction telling them what presumption arises if it 
t:: is more than 0. 08 was simply confusing because there was testimony 
that at other times the blood alcohol level was higher and such 
I I 
an instruction could do nothing but confuse the jury on this 
technical aspect of the case. Appellant contends that the giving 
of such an instruction, properly objected to, was reversible error. 
Most significantly, this Court in State v. Bradley, 
578 P.2d 1267 (Utah, 1978) held that where the State's evidence 
showed a 0.06 blood alcohol level at the time of the test, such 
a reading would not have given rise to the presumption at the 
time of the accident. If the State fails to show the presumption 
arises, the Court held, it is error to instruct the jury regarding 
the presumptions. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END OF THE STATE'S CASE 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW 
APPELLANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. 
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient 
to convict him on the charge of automobile homicide and for that 
reason the court below erred in not granting appellant's motion to 
dismiss made at the end of the State's case (R. 469). Appellant 
contends there was simply no evidence of his intoxication at the 
time of driving and of course intoxication is a necessary element 
of automobile homicide as the jury was instructed (R. 76) · 
- ll -
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The two officers who initially stopped appellant both 
testified that they found him walking rapidly near the scene and 
in injured condition (R. 304). Deputy Frank Smith said that he 
smelled the odor of alcohol on appellant (R. 305) but significantlv 
. I 
was asked for no other observations concerning appellant's condition I 
nor gave an opinion as to his state of intoxication. Deputy Jerry 
Rigby also said he smelled the odor of alcohol about appellant 
(R. 310) but he was never asked nor gave any opinions nor described 
any other observations other than saying appellant appeared to be 
"upset" (R. 313). Two other officers, Kenneth Peay and Arla Wilkins::! 
! 
of the Utah Highway Patrol, described that they observed appellant 
at the hospital from 11: 30 p. m. on July 21 until the tests were 
administered at 12: 14 a. m. on July 22 and they said nothing of appellant's 
condition and gave no opinions as to his level of intoxication. I 
Evelyn Mayberry, the nurse who took blood samples from appellant on 
July 22 at 12:14 a.m. and 12:48 a.m. talked with appellant on those 
occasions and gave no opinion and described no behavior indicating 
intoxication. The only person who was asked for any opinion was 
Eppie Duran, a friend of appellant's, who was in the car at the time· 
. i 
of the accident. He described being with appellant for two and halt ·. 
hours before the accident and said that appellant was not unusual 
in his activities (R. 368). No other direct evidence, indeed no 
evidence, was proffered as to appellant's state of intoxication. 
dmitted As discussed in Point II the results of blood tests were a 
- 12 -
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:h 
t!v, 
, I 
~to evidence over objection (see Point III A) and Dr. Finkle then 
described how at the time of driving the blood alcohol level would 
have been O. 05 and 0. 08. As discussed in Point II appellant claims 
the giving of the that instruction was error because that presump-
! 
:ior. tion created by that ins true ti on was virtually the only evidence that a jury 
could find that would lead to a conclusion he was under the influence 
of alcohol, Dr. Finkle described how i!IlIIlediately after taking a 
ed drink one's blood alcohol level would be almost i!IlIIleasurable as the 
process of absorbtion from the stomach into the blood stream takes 
.ns::! some time and usually does not reach a maximum peak for approximately 
45 minutes to one hour. Therefore, even assuming that appellant 
had an alcoholic beverage to drink at 10: 30, and Eppie Duran as 
'; described above did say that appellant was drinking something from 
a glass at 10:30 p.m., at 10:45 the blood alcohol level would have 
been low but could have been higher later at the time of the tests 
at 12:14 a.m. and 12 :45 a.m., some one and a half hours and two 
hours after the driving and the accident. This Court has often 
stated that it can overturn a verdict on the ground of insufficiency 
of the evidence only when the evidence is so without foundation 
that reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a reasonable 
doubt as to the defendant's guilt. See, for example, State v. Wilson, 
565 P.2d 66 (Utah, 1977). Clearly in this case there was much 
SYmpathy for the child victim and the jury could easily have found 
the appell ' ld ant s driving pattern was way out of line with what shou 
occur, 
However, appellant contends that no reasonable mind could 
- 13 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have found that the evidence was sufficient to believe appellant 
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the 
driving to such a degree that he was rendered incapable of safely 
driving a vehicle. Even if he was not safely driving a vehicle it 
does not follow that the level of intoxication, if there was one, 
is what rendered him incapable of driving. People operate vehicles 
unsafely every day without being under the influence of alcohol and 
appellant merely contends that where there was no evidence of intox· 
ication the Court should have granted appellant's motion to dismiss 
and should not have sent the matter to the jury on that offense. 
Because the Court erred in not granting appellant's motion to dismiss 
this Court should reverse the conviction and set it aside. 
POINT III A 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE 
EXHIBITS 11 AND 12, THE RESULTS OF BLOOD TESTS, 
BECAUSE THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THE PROBA-
TIVE VALUE OF SUCH TESTS. 
Appellant contends that recent legislation compels that 
this Court declare the court below erred in allowing into evidence 
k r e "han the blood alcohol test results because the tests were ta en mo ' 
one hour after the accident and the State did not prove the probativ~ 
value of such tests. 
Lynn Davis testified, as a chemist, that he analyzed 
the blood taken from appellant at 12:14 a.m. and 12:48 a.m. on July 
22, 1977, these samples being taken one and a half hours and two 
hours after the relevant time of 10:45 p.m. on July 21. He was 
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was allowed to state the results of 0 .19 over objection by appellant 
~hat Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44. 5 (1953 as amended) must first be 
complied with (R. 396). The objection was overruled. Appellant 
moved shortly thereafter for a mistrial based on the admission of 
such evidence (R. 399). The motion was seemingly denied and the 
State was told the necessary evidence must be forthcoming. Following 
the testimony of Dr. Finkle, the actual exhibits, ll and 12, were 
admitted over objection (R. 460). These exhibits contained in written 
form the 0.19 result. 
Appellant submits that all of the above was prejudicial 
error by the court below. The results and exhibits should not have 
been received. As discussed infra in Point II, the State did not 
showbyexpert testimony the probative value of the tests at the time 
of driving. Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.5 (1953 as amended), infra, became 
effective July 1, 1977. L. 1977, Ch. 270, §1. 
Appellant contends that the results of chemical tests 
were not admissible in the above matter under the law and facts of 
this case. The Auto Homicide Statute (76-5-207) provides in subsection 
(2): 
-
(2) The presumption established by section 
41-6-44(b) of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act, 
relating to blood alcohol percentages, shall 
be applicable to this section and any chemical 
test administered on a defendant with his 
consent or after his arrest under this section, 
whether with or against his consent, shall be 
admissible in accordance with the rules of 
evidence. [Emphasis Supplied} 
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The Motor Vehicle Act provides as follows: 
41-6-44.5. Driving while intoxicated--
Chemical tests as evidence--Presumption of 
blood alcohol level.--In any action or pro-
ceeding in which it is material to prove 
that a person was driving under the influence 
of alcohol, the results of a chemical test 
or tests as authorized in 41-6-44.10 shall 
be admitted as evidence if the chemical 
test was taken within one hour of the alleged 
incident. The level of the alcohol determined 
to be in the blood by the chemical test shall 
be presumed to be not less than the blood 
alcohol level of the person at the time of 
the incident. If the chemical test was not 
taken within one hour after the alleged 
incident, the evidence of the amount of 
alcohol in the person's blood as shown by 
the chemical test is admissible if expert 
testimony establishes its probative value 
and the results of said test may be given 
prima facie effect if established by expert 
testimony. 
From these statutes appellant contends it is clear t~t 
the presumptive levels of the Motor Vehicle Act shall apply to an 
auto homicide prosecution. The Motor Vehicle Act in turn says that 
in any proceeding in which it is relevant to show a person was under 
the influence of alcohol, certain conditions must be met. In an 
auto homicide prosecution it clearly is relevant to show the person 
was under the influence of alcohol at the time of driving - indeed 
that is the key element to the prosecution. In State v. Risk, SlO 
P.2d 2.5 (Utah, 1974) this Court reversed an auto homicide conviction 
4 ins true tel because the lower court, before the adoption of 41-6-4 .5, 
Thi; 
the jury on the presumptions of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1953) · 
h . 1 Act to Court said if the legislature meant for the Motor Ve ic e 
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Plv to the criminal code, they should have said so. Because the ap . 
legislature had not "said so" at that time, the error was reversible. 
~ow, the legislature has said in both the criminal code and the 
)lotor Vehicle Act that the presumptions apply in auto homicide cases. 
In State v. Bradley, supra, this Court dealt with a case tried before 
the effective date of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44. 5. The defendant, 
in an auto homicide conviction, claimed the chemical test should not 
be admitted unless it was "related back" by expert testimony. The 
Utah Court said that was not the law before the statute, 41-6-44.5, 
as without "relation back" testimony the test was admissible but the 
weight of the test was for the jury. Significantly, the Court did 
~otsay the statute, 41-6-44.5, would not apply to an auto homicide 
case, it merely did not apply in that case because of its effective 
date. No expert testimony was given there. The Court held that where 
the blood alcohol level was O. 06, no instructions could be given on 
the presumptive level unless expert testimony showed the blood alco-
!iol level was higher at the time of the incident, in cases arising 
before the effective date of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.5. It is 
apparent from Bradley, that this Court felt the new statute, 41-6-44.5, 
clearly would apply to auto homicide prosecutions and its mandates 
must be obeyed. If no "presumptive level" is shown at the time of 
I the t 
est, expert testimony is necessary. Here, the State's evidence 
c would show a test result below the 0.08 presumptive level at the 
time of d . . 
r1v1ng. Our legislature, in enacting Utah Code Ann. 
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§41-6-44.5 (1953) recognized the need for expert testimony in this 
area and set a time limit beyond which the test itself would not bt 
reliable enough to be admissible without foundation testimony. 
Appellant contends that as the test here was not given 
within the one hour time limit of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.S (1953), 
no chemical test results can be admitted unless expert testimony 
first is adduced showing the probative value of such a test. Asar;. 
in Point II, there was no such testimony showing the presumption wa: 
to be given effect. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS OF THE BLOOD 
ALCOHOL ANALYSIS OR ALTERNATIVELY DISMISSING 
THE ACTION. 
Appellant moved, prior to trial, to suppress the blood 
alcohol results of the blood samples taken from him (R. 23). A 
hearing was held before the same judge that tried the case (R. 52). 
Evidence was taken and memorandum submitted and appellant's motion 
was denied (R. 52). Appellant claims such a ruling was reversible 
error. 
Appellant was arrested in the late evening hours of 
July 21, 1977. Samples of his blood were taken on two occasions 
in the early hours of July 22, 1977, at approximately 12: 14 a.m. 
and 12:48 a.m. Those samples of blood were removed by a Registereo 
Nurse, Evelyn Mayberry. 
over to Lynn R. Davis, a 
Those samples of blood were eventuallY turn' 
chemist with the Salt Lake County Health 
Department. An analysis of those specimens were performed by Mr. 
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Davis and the specimens were then retained by Mr. Davis in an un-
refrigerated condition in room temperature (R. 495 ) , which conduct 
appellant contends is tantamount to the destruction of those physical 
specimens for purposes of further analysis and which conduct is 
thereby denial of due process of law. 
Appellant contends that the act of leaving his blood 
specimens at room temperature is tantamount to destroying those 
samples. No allegations of bad faith or improper motives are made 
but the conduct was clearly not accidental. Appellant contends 
that where one of the main elements of the offense is that he was 
under the influence of alcohol and where Utah has statutes which 
set forth that a person with a blood alcohol content of above 0. 08% 
is presumptively under the influence of alcohol (see Utah Code Ann. 
!41-6-44) that the blood alcohol level is certainly material to guilt 
or innocence and so the destroyed evidence is irretrievably lost to 
appellant and he is foreclosed from employing any experts he may 
choose to analyze that blood. The keeping of the specimen in a re-
frigerated condition could easily alleviate such problem. Appellant 
contends that this are of the law, destruction or loss of evidence, 
is closely akin to the suppression of evidence favorable to the 
accused by the State. I · h 1 · 1 d t is, owever, a re ative y newer area an 
so remedies need to be fashioned based upon the overall circumstances· 
Appellant submits that in this case two remedies were possible. One 
was a di . 
smissal of charge which has as an element intoxication, 
Count II, and the h f "d f h lt ot er is a suppression rom evi ence o t e resu s 
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of the State's tests performed upon appellant's blood. 
Several general rules have been developed in the area c: 
suppression of favorable evidence. 
This Court in State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah, Bi' 
announced the rule governing nondisclosure of evidence favorable an~ 
material to criminal defendants: 
. (S)uppression or destruction of evidence 
by those charged with prosecution, including 
police officers, constitutes a denial of due 
process if the evidence is material to guilt 
or innocence of the defendant in a criminal 
case . 
Id., at 478 
The rule in Stewart is even broader in scope than that 
of the leading United States Supreme Court case in the field of 
suppression of evidence, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed. 
2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), in which the Court said: 
We now hold that the suppression by the prose-
cution of evidence favorable to an accused 
upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or punish-
ment, irrespective of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution. 
Id., 373 U.S. at 87. 
Stewart's extension of the duty to disclose to police 
officers has also been approved by the United States Supreme Court 
in its opinion in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 31 L.Ed. Zd 
104, 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972): 
Moreover, whether the nondisclosure was a :e~~~t 
of negligence or design it is the responsibi ity 
' f' · an of the prosecutor. The prosecutor's of ice is 
entity and as such it is the spokesman for the 
Government. 
Id., 405 U.S. at 154. 
sd 
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~a c 
!~; 
If the police were not burdened with a duty to disclose, the prose-
cutor could successfully claim that police officers, who did the 
principle investigation of a case, had withheld exculpatory informa-
tion from him, and, therefore, that he had no duty to disclose the 
material. This would leave the defendant with no assertable claim 
an~ 
when his right to a fair trial had been clearly abridged. To impede 
~e process disclosure in this fashion would effectively abrogate 
the fundamental fairness objectives sought by the many constitutional 
decisions requiring disclosure of favorable and material evidence 
to the defendant. For this reason: 
The police are also part of the prosecution, 
and the taint on the trial is no less if 
they, rather than the State's Attorney, were 
guilty of nondisclosure. 
The duty to disclose is that of the State, 
which ordinarily acts through the prosecuting 
attorney; but if he too is the victim of 
police suppression of the material information, 
the State's failure is not on that account 
excused. We cannot condone an attempt to 
connect the defendant with the crime by 
questionable inferences which might be 
refuted by undisclosed and unproduced 
documents in the hands of the police. 
Barbee v. Warden, 331 F. 2d 842. 846 (4th 
Cir. 1964) 
Lynn Davis worked as an agent of law enforcement as the 
blood specimens were taken at the request of law enforcement and 
analyzed for their purposes. 
The destruction of evidence case is akin to the above 
analysis. Th" is Court has not dealt with this exact situation, but 
in ~te v. Stewart, 554 p. 2d 477 (Utah, 1975) this Court did deal 
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with a problem similar in nature. In that case, the defendant was 
convicted of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance and 
during the trial there was evidence presented that the undercover 
agent who purchased the narcotics had a tape recorder on his person 
during the transaction. That tape was requested during the trial 
by defense counsel and the request was denied. In ruling on that 
contention this Court said that: 
While it is true that a deliberate suppression 
or destruction of evidence by those charged 
with the prosecution, including police officers, 
constitutes a denial of due process if the 
evidence is material to the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant in a criminal case, there is 
no showing in this case that the material 
recorded on the tape in question was vital 
to the issue of whether or not the defendant 
was guilty of the charge. 
This was so, the Court held, because the defendant specifically deni 
having made the sale and denied even having seen the undercover wit· 
ness on the day the sale was supposedly to have occurred. This 
Court issued guidance in that case when it said: 
We think it advisable that those charged with 
investigation and prosecution of crime retain 
intact all records and other evidence per-
taining to the case until it is finally dis- . 
posed of. By adopting such a practice, a claim 
of unfairness by one charged with a criminal 
offense would be groundless. 
Thus, this Court has recognized that a destruction of 
evidence that is material to guilt or innocence is a denial of due 
s hawing the ta process of law. In that case, however, there was no 
would have been beneficial. The defendant there denied completely 
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even having met the undercover agent on the date in question. In 
this case, there can be no question but that appellant's blood 
aicohol level was relevant to his guilt or innocence of the charge 
of automobile homicide. Given the simple nature of refrigeration 
and the small size of blood samples, appellant contends that the 
failure to follow the advise of this Court should warrant one of 
the remedies sought by the appellant. 
In this case, of course, appellant did not show that 
the evidence would have been favorable to him. Such a burden and 
task under the circumstances was obviously completely impossible as 
the evidence had been destroyed. Appellant contends that he need 
not "prove" the material would be favorable to him as he would in a 
situation where there was evidence merely suppressed, but not 
destroyed. In State v. Brewer, 549 P. 2d 188 (Ariz. App. 1976), the 
Court dealt with a conviction in a fraud case. The defendant alleged 
that certain evidence was destroyed prior to the trial which may have 
tended to establish his innocence. The Court examined that contention 
and noted that the destroyed documents had been transcribed and that 
transcript had been made available to the defendant. The Court in 
discussing the destruction of evidence said that to be in violation 
of due process : 
The State must know, or have reason to know, 
that the evidence being destroyed was either 
material or favorable to the accused. 
mus. in h t at case, there was no required showing that the material 
iie favorabl "f . 
e 1 it was destroyed. It would be enough if the defendant 
- 23 -
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could show either that it was material or favorable and that the 
State knew or had reason to know of that materiality. Appellant 
submits that the very nature of the evidence in question must lead 
the Court to the conclusion that the State through its agent 
knew that the results of the blood test (where intoxication was a 
crucial element of the offense) would be material. This is the 
case, appellant contends, where, as the Court said in In Re Cameron, 
439 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1968): 
The police or prosecution may disable the State 
from ever giving a defendant a fair trial if 
they have lost or destroyed or otherwise made 
unavailable vital defense evidence. 
In Cameron, the California Court noted that if such a situation arost 
a new trial should not be held, but the defendant should be dischar5t 
The State of Washington dealt with a similar case in 
State v. Wright, 557 P.2d 1 (Wash, 1976). In that case the defendant 
was convicted of first degree murder for the killing of his wife. 
Her badly decomposed body was found in a room and had apparently beei 
dead for approximately 3 weeks. After removing all of the clothing 
from the body, due to its highly infected and unpleasant nature, 
the police burned all clothing before any analysis for blood or 
any other tests were performed. The police gave permission to a 
relative of the deceased to remove and burn the bedding and mattress 
and other items from the room. This was all accomplished before the 
defendant had been appointed an attorney but after he was arrested 
and before any scientific tests of any kind were performed. In 
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:;. 
that case, the defendant prior to trial made a motion to dismiss the 
charge on the basis of a denial of due process of law. The Court 
began by discussing "what is material" and reached the inescapable 
conclusion that such evidence could have been material, but that it 
".as impossible to tell whether or not the evidence would be favor-
able to the defendant because it had been destroyed. The Court 
quoted a leading case in the area, United States v. Bryant, 439 F. 2d 
642 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Washington Court quoted as follows: 
The purpose of the duty [to disclose] is not 
simply to correct an imbalance of advantage 
whereby the prosecution may surprise the 
defense at trial with new evidence; rather, 
it is also to make of the trial a search for 
truth informed by all relevant material, much 
of which, because of imbalance in investigative 
resources, will be exclusively in the hands 
of the government. 
Further, quoting from Bryant, the Court said that: 
Before a request for discovery has been made, 
the duty of disclosure is operative as a duty 
of preservation. 
In Wright, the defendant pointed out several possibilites 
for the use of evidence and the Court held that by so doing, he dem-
onstrated a reasonable possiblity that the evidence destroyed by the 
police was material to guilt or innocence and favorable. 
The Court then went on with the more difficult task 
' of fashioning a remedy. They noted there have been situ ta tions 
where th 
e prosecution has made "an earnest effort" to preserve the 
mat · 
erials, but noted this was not the case. Even though the evidence 
·ias n t d 
· 
0 
estoryed for the specific purpose of hindering the defense, 
- 25 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the motive of the prosecution or the police is not determinative. 
The purpose of the duty of preservation "is not to punish the polic; 
but to insure a fair trial for the accused". The Court noted the 
destruction was intentional as there was no effort made to preserve 
the evidence and further noted that neither "administrative conven· t 
ience nor inadequate facilities justifies a failure to preserve 
potential evidence". Therefore, the defendant was denied due proces: 
of law. The Court noted that usually in a suppression type case a 
new trial can be ordered and the defendant can be given the suppress:. 
evidence. Of course, that is not possible in this case, so the 
Court saw no alternative other than to reverse the conviction and 
dismiss the charges, then went on to discuss some of the practical 
problems that would be created for police and gave suggestions as 
how to handle that. 
Appellant contends that his case is very much similar 
in that the evidence was clearly intentionally not refrigerated 
even though there is no contention made that it was done as a purpos< 
to hinder defense. Administrative ease is not a sufficient reason 
for denying evidence. There is no possible way appellant could 
have shown that the evidence would have been favorable, but it clea:~ 
was material and it might have been favorable. Appellant contends 
the Court should have followed the Wright rationale and held that th< 
h d Of law and dis· destruction of such evidence denies im ue process 
h · h" In not so doi·ng, the Court erred. missed the c arge against im. 
Alternatively, appellant's blood alcohol level should have been 
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suppressed from evidence prior to trial. 
In State v. Trimble, 402 P.2d 162 (N.M. 1965) the Court 
dealt with a destruction of evidence case much weaker than appellant's. 
~ iliat case the defendant, a minister, was convicted of first degree 
murder. It was defendant's theory at trial that he acted in self 
defense. He claimed to have in his possession a letter and some 
tapes which he was about to show the victim when the victim attacked 
the defendant and necessitated the shooting. After the shooting 
the police obtained a search warrant and obtained the letter and 
tapes and thereafter these were never seen again. The defendant 
claimed they were helpful to his defense of self defense in that 
they would have contained what he said they did and corroborated 
his trial testimony. The State argued that the existence of the 
letter and the tape were explained by defendant on the stand and 
his testimony was not con tr averted and so there was no prejudice. 
The Court initially began by saying that the situation was similar 
to the suppression of favorable evidence by the State, although 
not exactly alike. The Court went on to hold over the argument of 
the State that even though the suppression was not willful, the same 
rule applies. The Court noted that the presence and existence of 
the letter and its assistance to defendant in corrobrating his ver-
sion were, "too apparent for argument". Therefore, under the facts 
of the case, the Court had no alternative, but to' reverse and set 
aside the sentence. 
The situation in this case is like the situation brought 
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to light in the California case of People v. Hitch, 527 P.2d 362 
(Cal. 1974). In that case a person was convicted of driving while 1 
under the influence of alcohol and the results of a breathalyzer 
test were admitted at this trial. The defendant sought to analyze 
the test ampoules which had been used while the breath test had bee" 
given by police officers. Those had been destroyed after the test 
by the police officer. The California Court began its analysis and saii 
that the results of such test clearly constitute material evidence 
and went on to say that evidence: 
Substantially affecting the credibility of 
the results of the test would appear to be 
material and the suppression of such evidence 
would deny defendant a fair trial. 
They noted, of course, that the critical evidence was not before 
them so it was not for the Court to determine whether the evidence 
was or was not favorable to the issue of the defendant's guilt or 
innocence. The Court likened the situation in that case to a sit· 
uation where an undercover informant is known by the police on a 
drug sale, but the name is not revealed for the defendant to locate 
and interview the witness. The Court noted that in those situations 
where the defendant has shown a reasonable possibility that the in· 
formant could give favorable evidence his identity must be disclosed 
or the case dismissed. Sl.·mi.·larly the Court i.·n Hi·tch sai'd that given 
' 
the availability of the test ampoule and its contents there is a 
reasonable possibility that it would constitute favorable evidence 
on the issue of guilt or innocence and if that is shown then such 
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evidence must be disclosed. If the evidence was available, it clearly 
must be disclosed. The Court in that case gave prospective effect 
only to their rule because of the immensity of cases dealing with 
a breathalyzer and test ampoules in California alone. The rule 
to be followed would be that the test results would be suppressed 
on the part of the State if the evidence were not preserved and 
discover ab le by defense. 
In fashioning a remedy appellant contends that the 
Court should have weighed the significance of the lost or destroyed 
evidence and the conduct which lead to that destruction. Further, 
the Court should have considered the ease or difficulty of retaining 
such evidence in determining what remedy ought to apply. Thus, 
in this case, we have a situation where a person certainly knowledg-
able in the area of blood analysis, knew that by failing to refriger-
ate the specimen, the specimen would be forever lost to further 
analysis. The method of maintaining the evidence simply would have 
been to place the samples in refrigeration. The evidence and 
materiality has already been discussed and is, as the Court in 
!E_imble, said, "too apparent for argument". Balancing these 
factors appellant contends that the Court should reverse the lower 
court. 
The evidence that was destroyed should not have been 
admitted for other reasons (see Point III A) but appellant submits 
it was error to allow the State to use such evidence at all when 
he is not · given a fair opportunity to utilize independent experts. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN COMMITTING APPELLANT TO 
PRISON IN APPELLANT'S ABSENCE. 
Appellant contends that he was entitled to be present 
when he was conunitted to the Utah State Prison and that the procedur 
used by the Court was in error and appellant is entitled to be re-
sentenced. 
After the jury verdict of guilty was returned on March 
29, 1978 (R. 55, 56), appellant was referred to the Adult Probation 
and Parole Department for a pre-sentence report and sentencing was 
set for April 14, 1978. On that date there are entries reflecting 
conflicting events. The written and signed Order of the Court 
(R. 149) reflects that the appellant was referred to the Division 
of Corrections for a period not exceeding 90 days, it appearing 
that imprisonment may be appropriate in this case. The Division 
of Corrections was requested to retain custody of the appellant 
principally at the Utah State Prison and be returned for sentencing 
on July 14, 1978. The minute entry date April 14, 1978 (R. 140) • 
indicates that appellant was sentenced to be imprisoned in the Utah 
State Prison for zero to five years and a stay of execution was 
granted to July 14 for sentencing. The minute entry also shows 
appellant was to undergo a 90 day evaluation at the Utah State 
Prison. On July 14 both the minute entry (R. 155) and the written 
( 156) · d" h there was to be a further order of the Court R. in icates t at 
90 day evaluation at any appropriate place in the discretion of 
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the Division of Corrections and the appellant was to be returned to 
Court for sentencing on October 13, 1978. On August 16, 1978, a 
bmch warrant was issued for appellant (R. 160) seemingly on the 
basis that appellant absconded from his second 90 day evaluation 
Ur! which was being performed at Odyssey House (R. 159). On October 27, 
1978, the minute entry reflects that there was already an outstanding 
bench warrant and appellant was connnitted to the Utah State Prison 
"as heretofore sentenced". The minute entry reflects that appellant 
was personally not present (R. 165). That date connnitment was 
issued to the Utah State Prison (R. 166). 
Appellant contends that the order of October 27, 1978, 
committing appellant to Utah State Prison "as heretofore sentenced" 
was unlawful and erroneous. Utah Code Ann. §76-3-404(2) (1953 as 
amended) : 
Any connnitment for a pre-sentence investigation 
under this section shall not constitute a 
commitment to prison. 
Appellant contends that under that statute and under the written orders 
of the Court of both July 14, 1978 and April 14, 1978 appellant was 
not sentenced to the Utah State Prison as a referral to the Divison 
of Corrections for a 90 day evaluation does not constitute a commit-
ment to prison. The minute entry of April 14, 1978 lends some con-
fusion and appellant d f h C contends that the written or er o t e ourt 
should govern and ;f · h U h St t P · ~ a cormnitment is to i.ssue to t e ta a e rison 
appellant is entitled to be present at that critical stage of the 
Proceeding. 
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Utah Code Ann. §77-35-3 (1953) says that for the pur-
poses of judgment if the conviction is for a felony the defendant 
must be personally present. This Court in State v. Fedder, 1 Utah 
2d 117, 262 P.2d 753 (1953) has held that even though the Court 
cormnitted no error it must use whatever means are available in 
bringing defendant before the Court for pronouncement of judgment. 
That case has not been altered since 1953 and appellant contends 
that while it might be an extremely hollow victory he is entitled 
to be present when he is committed to the Utah State Prison. This 
Court should declare that the procedure employed by the trial court 
in this case, of saying the words "you are committed to prison" and 
then sending someone for a 90 day evaluation in the custody of 
the Division of Corrections is not judgment being imposed because 
our statute says specifically that a referral to the Division 
of Corrections is not a commitment to prison. Therefore, appellant 
contends that this Court should hold the procedure employed by the 
trial court erroneous and unlawful and remand the matter so that 
appellant may be properly sentenced if his other points on appeal 
are not well taken. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, that the evidence did no: 
prove a necessary element of the offense, that the jury was imprope:. 
h d d . d h h ld have been supprei' instructed, t at evi ence was a mitte t at s ou 
f llV 
and that appellant was improperly sentenced, appellant respect u · 
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submits the convcition should be reversed, or in the alternative 
appellant should receive a new trial, or alternatively appellant 
should be properly sentenced. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Attorney for Appellant 
- 33 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
